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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
AMERICAN AGGREGATE
CORPORATION, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
OTTO B U E H N E R & COMPANY, a _ AT
corporation, and PAUL BUEHNER, \ U a s e NoDefendants and Respondents,
vs.
D. W. BRIMHALL,
Additional Defendant on
Counterclaim, and Cross-Complainant.

Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant
R E P L Y ARGUMENT
I.
SINCE N E I T H E R BRIMHALL NOR RESPONDENTS B U E H N E R HAVE A P P E A L E D
OR CROSS-APPEALED FROM ANY PORTION OF T H E JUDGMENT AS MODIFIED,
AND BRIMHALL HAS NOT F I L E D ANY
*
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BRIEF,
DEFENDANTS - RESPONDENTS
H A V E N O S T A N D I N G TO A R G U E T H A T
BRIMHALL HAD ANY GREATER RIGHT
T H A N TO B E P A I D A F I X E D F E E P E R TON
FOR MINING AND CRUSHING SERVICES.
Plaintiff has appealed from only paragraphs 1
and 6 of the judgment, which dismissed plaintiff's
complaint with prejudice and which denied plaintiff
interest and costs. No one has appealed from any portion of paragraphs 2 to 5 of the judgment, as modified by court order October 15, 1973. As specified by
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the judgment as amended after
hearing on motion:
"4. By reason of the settlement agreement
made between plaintiff A M E R I C A N A G G R E G A T E C O R P O R A T I O N and D . W.
B R I M H A L L on July 9, 1970, D. W . B R I M H A L L became entitled to $7.25 per ton instead
of $10.00 per ton for -mining and crushing services on all tonnage shipped to defendant O T T O
B U E H N E R & C O M P A N Y totaling 5,172
tons, less a credit of $29,000.00 collected by
D. W . B R I M H A L L on the first 4,000 tons
shipped to defendant O T T O B U E H N E R &
C O M P A N Y in 1969 and 1970, leaving a balance of $8,497.00 payable to D. W . B R I M H A L L computed at the rate of $7.25 per ton
for the 1172 tons in excess of the first 4,000 tons,
which amount shall be payable to him out of the
money deposited or to be deposited in court by
defendant O T T O B U E H N E R & COMPANY.
"5. Under said settlement agreement, as to
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said 5,172 tons, D. W . B R I M H A L L was not
entitled to $5,000.00 'move-in-costs' paid to him
by O T T O B U E H N E R & C O M P A N Y , nor
to make any other charge against plaintiff in
excess of said $7.25 per ton." (R. 941, Ab.
143-144. Italics added).
As the judgment was originally prepared by
counsel for defendants and signed before counsel for
plaintiff had opportunity to file exceptions or objections, $37,149.00 was payable to Brimhall for crushing
only (an excessive amount), and Brimhall was allowed
to "retain as his separate property the $5,000.00
move-in-cost paid to him by O T T O B U E H N E R &
C O M P A N Y . " (R. 854, Ab. 142). The modification
of the portion of the judgment as to Brimhall was
made to conform to his own admissions made on deposition and at the trial that he was to be paid a fixed
price of $10 per ton for mining and crushing services,
and nothing in excess of that amount.
Inasmuch as neither Brimhall nor defendantsrespondents have appealed from that portion of the
judgment as modified, we believe they are precluded
from collaterally assailing that portion of the judgment as modified. However, on pages 12 to 22 of their
brief defendants-respondents argue their Point I :
"The Court did not commit prejudicial
error in finding that Brimhall was a 'joint venturer' with appellant and as such was authorized
to act as an agent for appellant in entering into
the purchase order agreement for the sale of
American Aggregate qnartzite." (Italics added).
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The statement itself impliedly acknowledges that
the purchase order issued by Otto Buehner & Company
to Brimhall personally with all sums payable personally
to Brimhall, and nothing to plaintiff, was for aggregate owned by plaintiff-appellant American Aggregate
Corporation.
On pages 14 to 19 of their brief, defendantsrespondents quote some irrelevant conjectural testimony of Brimmhall, claiming that it "supports the
trial court's finding of a joint venture." The "finding"
was a conclusion unsupported by the evidence, and
inconsistent with the judgment as modified. Defendants argue that such testimony (although inconsistent
with Brimhall's admissions) shows that there was some
"agreement" prepared by counsel for plaintiff, but not
signed, which would have allowed Brimhall $10 per
ton for crushing services alone, pins "division of the
profits" The officers of plaintiff* denied there ever was
any such "agreement" oral or written, but only an oral
agreement to pay Brimhall, the independent mining
and crushing contractor a fixed fee of $10 per ton
when the aggregate was sold and the money collected.
Inasmuch as Brimhall testified that the going rate was
only $7 per ton for those services the $10 per ton
included not only a profit within the $7, but also an
additional profit of $$3 per ton. Obviously, no lawyer
representing plaintiff would have drawn any kind of
"agreement" so one-sided in favor of Brimhall, to allow
him to reap the normal profit within the going rate of
$7 per ton, plus the $3 per ton extra profit, and then
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also a "division of the profits" without even permitting
American Aggregate Corporation as the owner to
recover all of its costs and expenses. Brimhall's own
admissions on deposition and on cross-examination, refuted such fantastic unconscionable claims.
"The rule is that the testimony of a witness is no
stronger than where it is left on cross-examination."
Oberg v. Sanders, 111 Utah 507, 518, 184 P . 2d 229.
This applies not only to the admissions made by D . W .
Brimhall, but also to those made by defendant Paul
Buehner and other witnesses for defendants and for
Brimhall. By self-serving declarations and hearsay,
defendants attempted to make Brimhall an "agent" of
plaintiff; but they want this Court to overlook the fact
that defendants induced Brimmhall to sign acceptance
of an outrageous purchase order (Exhibit 19-P) in
the name of D. W . Brimhall personally for the sale
of plaintiff's aggregate not only below plaintiff's costs
at a figure dictated by defendants, but with all payments
therefor solely to Brimhall, with nothing payable to
plaintiff as owner. Brimhall was thereby acting adversely to plaintiff as owner of the materials.
The sworn admissions of Brimhall included: (a)
As a licensed independent contractor, in 1967 Brimhall
made an oral agreement with American Aggregate to
move into plaintiff's quarry and mine and crush plaintiff's white quartz aggregate at his own convenience
with his own equipment and employees at his own expense. (It. 209, 566-568, Ab. 27, 80). (b) H e said
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he was to receive $10 per ton when the material was
sold. (R. 250, Ab. 33). That $10 included "whatever
was necessary to get it into a finished product", including removing overburden, mining, crushing, moving
equipment, wear on equipment, etc. (R. 214-216.
Ab. 28). (c) The $10 per ton included his anticipated
profit (R. 605-606, Ab. 86-87), for that type of operation was then generally contracted at the rate of $7
per ton. (d) H e was to be paid the $10 per ton when
American Aggregate sold the aggregate and collected
the money. (R. 278-279, Ab. 36). (e) H e never was
paid anything in excess of $10 per ton (even when the
sale price was the regular price of $35 per ton).
Defendants argue on page 12 that Don Reimann,
(vice-president), prior to the time defendants issued
the purchase order to Brimhall, Exhibit 19-P, told
Buehner "to deal with Brimhall, work it out with Brimhall"; but Don Reimann testified that he told Buehner
he could deal with Brimhall as to sizes, not as to prices.
(R. 365-366, Ab. 48). No reasonable person could
believe that when the Reimanns owned the aggregate
which had been specified by the architects, and the
samples from plaintiff's quarry had been approved by
the architects, that plaintiff would consent to allow a
competitor to dictate the price at which plaintiff would
sell, or o delegate that function to the crushing contractor. I t is undisputed that Paul Buehner asked plaintiff for quotations which recognized plaintiff's ownership. Plaintiff quoted $29.50 per ton delivered, for
selected sizes.
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Buehner admitted that he told Don Reimann that
the quoted price was "too high." When Buehner represented that he could get the same material or similar
material for $19.50 a ton from a man named Chidester,
Don Reimann replied that "they couldn't get that
material unless they stole it from us. It was specified
on the job." Buehner then threatened to siibstitute
other material if he could not get the plaintiff's aggregate at his own price, but Reimann said he had talked
to the architect and that the architects would not allow
any substitution. Plaintiff refused to lower the quotation. (R. 335-339, Ab. 42-43).
Paul Buehner used Brimhall to negotiate for him
and to act as his tool or agent, as demonstrated by Paul
Buehner's own admissions. Buehner testified (a) H e
asked Brifhall to talk to Don and Rich Reimann and
see if they would lower the price. (R. 44-48, Ab. 6-7).
(b) Buehner then told Brimhall he planned to take
all sizes known as "crusher run." That representation
was utterly false, as Buehner intended to take selected
sizes. Buehner had Brimhall go back and forth to the
officers of American Aggregate several times, (c)
Buehner told Brimhall to tell Don Reimann that the
price was too high, and that he had better lower the
figure, (d) When Brimhall returned with a quotation
from plaintiff of $25.50 for "crusher run", per ton,
and stated it was the lowest price American Aggregate
would take, Buehner said, "No deal" (R. 49-50, 140142, Ab. 7, 19). Although Buehner said he did not
know what the agreement was between American Ag-

7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

gregate and Brimhall, he told Brimhall that if Brimhall
did not sign with him he was going to have a substitution and give a purchase order to Chidester. Buehner
offered $5,000.00 "move-in-cost" to sign a purchase
order for $20.50 a ton, and Brimhall signed Exhibit 19P soon afterwards, on October 17, 1969, with the understanding that the Buehners were going to take "crusher
run". Exhibit 20-P stated that the purchase order was
for "selected sizes," (not crusher run). (R. 222-225),
608-610, 632, Ab. 30, 88, 92). Obviously, neither Brimhall nor defendants sent American Aggregate Corporation a copy of such putative purchase order.
While defendants argue that plaintiff was bound
by the acts of Brimhall, under a theory of a joint venture, the claim of joint venture contradicts the admissions of Brimhall that he was to be paid a fixed fee of
$10 per ton, and the judgment as modified specifies
that plaintiff is not liable for any additional charges
than the $7.25 per ton agreed on in the settlement made
July 9, 1970, when the figure was scaled down from
$10 per ton. If Brimhall acted as "agent" for any one,
it was for the benefit of the defendants to unjustly
enrich defendants to the financial loss and detriment
of plaintiff.
II.
T H E B U E H N E R D E F E N S E OF "REL E A S E " WAS SPURIOUS, SINCE PLAINTIFF NEVER EXECUTED ANY RELEASE,
A N D P A U L B U E H N E R S A D M I S S I O N S ON
8

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

DEPOSITION
PLUS
ADMISSIONS
ON
CROSS-EXAMINATION,
PLUS
DEFENDA N T S ' O W N D O C U M E N T , E X H I B I T 40-P,
DISCREDITED BUEHNER'S TESTIMONY
B O T H A S TO " R A T I F I C A T I O N " O F A N Y
$20.50 P E R T O N P R I C E A N D " R E L E A S E " .
On pages 22 to 24 Respondents argue that Appellant "ratified" Exhibit 19-P (the purchase order issued
by Otto Buehner & Company to D . W . Brimhall personally) as to $20.50 per ton for the aggregate. I t is
claimed that on May 29, 1970, Paul Buehner had a
telephone conversation with Don Reimann. Buehner
said he "refreshed his recollection" by referring to a
diary, for May 29 and June 3, 1970. H e testified that
Don Reimann said "we would accept the price on the
aggregate which has been discussed", and he "would
like to have us help him with the use of our models and
molds on the oxen (for two temples) at the reduced
price." Buehner tied the said "agreement" as to the
"aggregate" price to the "agreement" for the molds of
the oxen. Such testimony was offered in support of
the challenged defense of a purported "release" by
plaintiff American Aggregate Corporation to Otto
Buehner & Company.
Independent of the fact that a lot of self-serving
entries are made in diaries, even by criminals, the defense was sham, as illustrated on cross-examination.
The transaction relating to the molds for oxen for the
Ogden and Provo Temples, was not negotiated with
plaintiff at all, but with Style-Crete, Inc., an entirely
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separate corporation from American Aggregate. Exhibit P-40 dated March 18, 1971, was prepared by
Otto Buehner & Company. I t makes no reference
whatsoever to the aggregate owned by American Aggregate Corporation. Paul Buehner's direct examination
was destroyed on cross-examination.
On cross-examination Paul Buehner admitted that
no purchase order ever was issued in the name of American Aggregate Corporation for any of the aggregate
hauled away from plaintiff's leasehold in Box Elder
County to the Otto Buehner & Company plant in Murray during 1969 and 1970. If there had been an "agreement" with plaintiff to "ratify" a price of $20.50 per
ton, (which was below plaintiff's costs), Otto Buehner
& Company certainly would not have neglected to issue
a purchase order and have plaintiff sign it. Exhibit
40-P, instead of showing generosity on the part of Otto
Buehner & Company to plaintiff it showed that Otto
Buehner & Company was going to get the finished
molds from Style-Crete, Inc., (not from American Aggregate Corporation) which were worth thousands of
dollars, according to the testimony.
The pleaded defenses of "release" and "ratification" were spurious. The proffered testimony in support thereof, was destroyed on cross-examination.
Paul Buehner did not offer any testimony to contradict the following testimony of Richard C. Reimann,
president of plaintiff corporation: Buehner called Reimann about a month after the meeting of May 1, 1970,
and asked for a quotation several hundreds tons of
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aggregate for the B.Y.U. job, and Reimann quoted
the regular price of $35 per ton. (R. 459-460, Ab. 63).
About the same time, Marv Allred, plant superintendent for Otto Buehner & Company, called Don R.
Reimann for a quotation and also was quoted $35 per
ton. That testimony was not rebutted. No purchase
order was issued, but plaintiff subsequently discovered
that its aggregate continued to be hauled away. Plaintiff was frustrated in its attempts to get any weigh
tickets or accounting from either Otto Buehner & Company or its contract-carriers Clark Tank Lines and
Christensen Feed & Seed.
III.
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
POINT
TO N E I T H E R P R O O F N O R A D M I S S I O N S
OF ANY "RATIFICATION" BY P L A I N T I F F A P P E L L A N T OF T H E B R I M H A L L PURC H A S E ORDER, NOR TO A N Y P O S S I B L E
"PROOF" THAT P L A I N T I F F MADE ANY
"PROFIT" IN T H E TRANSACTION.
On page 24 it is argued that there was a "ratification" of the Brimhall purchase order (Exhibit 19-P).
However, respondents cite no evidence to support such
contention. They make the unwarranted contention that
counsel for appellant "argues" that "such ratification
by his clients was illegal because it violated the Unfair
Practices Act." That is a misquotation. There never
was any admission of "ratification." Appellant contended that even if there had been an attempted rati11
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

fication, which there was not, it would have been against
public policy and void under the Unfair Pratices Act,
Sees. 13-5-3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 15 and 17, U.C.A. 1953, because the Brimhall sale of plaintiff's materials was
below plaintiff's costs. Plaintiff also contended that it
would have been illegal under the statute prohibiting
price-fixing, restraint of trade and monopoly, Sees.
50-1-1, 2, 3, 6 and 10, U.C.A. 1953. Buehner admitted
that plaintiff was a competitor of Otto Buehner &
Company in the aggregate business.
There is no basis for the argument on pages 24
and 25 of the Brief of Defendants-Respondents that
plaintiff-appellant made any "profit" from either
crushing or hauling. Plaintiff admittedly hauled only
259 tons to defendant Buehner company plant, at the
request of defendant corporation. As to the 4,000 tons
of plaintiff's aggregate wrongfully sold under the
Brimhall purchase order, Otto Buehner contracted the
hauling thereof to Clark Tank Lines for $7.55 per ton,
Exhibit 5-D. Plaintiff had nothing to do with Clark
Tank Lines, and did not see such Exhibit 5-D until
the time of trial. Plaintiff could not possibly have
profited from that hauling which was under the control
and management of Otto Buehner & Company and its
contract carrier and subcontractor Christensen Feed &
Seed.
On pages 10 and 11 a small portion of the testimony of Gaylen Christensen is quoted to the effect that
Don Reimann did not tell that subcontractor of Clark
Tank Lines not to deliver any more aggregate, but
12
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told the witness to continue hauling. Such quoted testimony was not merely contradicted by Don Reimann,
but even destroyed on cross-examination of Christensen
and of his employee which showed that Don Reimann
called to find out how much tonnage had been hauled
from the quarry which had gone over the Christensen
Feed & Seed scales; and that false information was
given to Reimann as to the quantities. Clark Tank
Lines had been told to stop hauling from plaintiff's
quarry as early as February 1970. Both Clark Tank
Lines as Buehner's contract carrier and Christensen as
subcontractor, when they ultimately furnished information, gave false and misleading information showing
lesser amounts than actually hauled, as illustrated by
Exhibits 7-P, 21-P and 28-P. Except for an understatement of tonnage on June 16, 1970, Exhibit 25-P,
defendants gave plaintiff no information directly at
all until shortly prior to filing suit in 1971. Defendants
withheld weigh tickets and an accounting, which had
been promised in the conference of May 1, 1970. Defendants hindered and delayed plaintiff and counsel in
getting accurate information as to tonnage of plaintiff's
materials hauled away, and some of that information
was not obtained until the time of trial.
Typical of misstatements of the evidence, on page
2 of their brief respondents contradict the admissions
made by Brimhall, by representing that Brimhall and
plaintiff American Aggregate Corporation "had a
joint interest in crushed white quartzite which had remained substantially unsold for three or four years."
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Brimhall admitted that he had only a right to collect
$10 per ton for mining and crushing under an oral
agreement made in 1967. Only two years later, on October 17, 1969, he signed Exhibit 19-P at the request
of Paul Buehner. There were sales of said aggregate
in 1967 and 1968, including sales to Otto Buehner &
Company at $35 per ton (Exhibit 4-P). Brimhall admitted receiving payments in 1967 and 1968, never in
excess of $10 per ton. Defendants objected to Exhibits
31-P and 51-P showing payment to Brimhall January
31, 1968, and the trial court sustained objection on the
ground that such exhibits did not relate to any issue in
this case. After having such evidence excluded, respondents resort to misleading generalities, such as the
unfounded contention on page 30 that "there were approximately 5000 tons of crushed material which neither
Appellant nor Brimhall had been able to sell for three
or four years."
Independent of such exaggeration and unfounded
argument, Brimhall never attempted to make any sale
until Paul Buehner induced him to sign purchase order
19-P in his own name for the sale of plaintiff's materials. Apparently, the respondents want to create the
impression that so much time had elapsed since a sale
had been made, that Brimhall was justified in some
manner in accepting $5,000 "move-in-cost" from Otto
Buehner & Company as an inducement to sell in his
own name with all proceeds payable to himself, plaintiff's aggregate not only below the lowest price plaintiff said he could sell without "going in the red", but
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below plaintiff's costs. Brimhall not only admitted he
had no authority to sell, but in March 1970 when Paul
Buehner asked him for a price on 700 additional tons
for another job, Brimhall stated that he had exceeded
his authority and that the Buehners had to deal with
American Aggregate Corporation. (R. 233-234, Ab.
31-32).
By amended counterclaim defendants pretended
that they had obtained too much aggregate. They sought
to charge plaintiff with the fictitious claim for damages
for defendants' own wrongful acts in inducing Brimhall to sign Exhibit 19-P. Although Otto Buehner &
Company had contracted with Clark Tank Lines to
haul plaintiff's materials out of plaintiff's quarry to
complete the process of converting plaintiff's goods to
the use and benefit and unjust enrichment of plaintiff's
competitor Otto Buehner & Company, defendants attempted to make plaintiff responsible therefor. Plaintiff had refused to sign or endorse said putative Brimhall purchase order when its officers saw it about May
1, 1970, and had refused to ratify it. At the trial, defendants contended in defiance of the Statute of Frauds
and in violation of the Parol Evidence Rule that Exhibit 19-P should be construed not only as a document
binding on the plaintiff as the victim of fraud and illegal price-fixing, to enable defendant Otto Buehner
& Company to have aggregate at $20.50 per ton for
the church office building job, but in addition that such
document should be construed (or amended in effect)
so that instead of relating exclusively to the church
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office building project, referred to in Exhibit 19-P, it
would extend to any an every other job to enable Otto
Buehner & Company to take any quantity of plaintiff's
aggregate at defendant's dictated below-cost-price of
$20.50 per ton.
Knowing that plaintiff refused to sign or endorse
Exhibit 19-P, on page 25 of their brief respondents
make the unwarranted argument that appellant
"is trying to convince this court that a seller can
enter into a contract below cost and after delivering the full amount of the product, repudiate its
agreement and recover on the theory that its violation of the law excuses its performance."
Plaintiff-appellant did not execute any contract
with defendants Buehner, so plaintiff did not repudiate
any "contract." Plaintiff quoted prices for its material
as it had the legal right to do, and refused to lower its
prices to a below-cost figure demanded by its competitor. Defendants well-knew they had to obtain those
materials from plaintiff's quarry to comply with the contract Otto Buehner & Company had made with the general contractor and with the Church as owner. Otto
Buehner & Company was quoted the price of $29.50
per ton for aggregate of selected sizes for a quantity of
4,000 tons, and it had that figure in submitting its bid.
Contrary to the argument of respondents, plaintiff
corporation only delivered 259 tons (at the request of
defendant's agents) out of a total of 5,172 tons. Except
for the 259 tons delivered by plaintiff for various jobs,
the defendant Otto Buehner & Company helped itself
16
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to plaintiff's aggregate by contracting the hauling of
4,000 tons to Clark Tank Lines, Exhibit 5-D. Plaintiff never repudiated any agreement because the Buehners refused to make an agreement with plaintiff. They
were determined to circumvent the plaintiff by their
price-fixing scheme by giving a purchase order to
Brimhall, which he subsequently admitted he had no
authority to sign. Defendants made Brimhall their
agent and tool in a price-fixing scheme, to defraud
plaintiff. When officers of Otto Buehner & Company
asked plaintiff for quotations on other jobs and were
given quotations of $35 per ton because of the size of
the order did not warrant a lower quotation, the Buehners did not issue a purchase order to plaintiff. They
knew they could not get plaintiff to sign a purchase
order at their dictated below-cost prices, so Otto Buehner & Company continued to haul away plaintiff's materials behind the backs of plaintiff's officers.
Respondents' argument that the Unfair Practices
Act and the statute against price-fixing are "not applicable to a seller who repudiates his own contract", is
not in point since plaintiff never made a contract with
defendants. Over objections of counsel for plaintiff,
overruled by the trial court, defendants were permitted
to introduce all kinds of incompetent evidence which
was objectionable both under the Statute of Frauds
Sec. 25-5-4 (1), U.C.A. 1953, and under the Parol
Evidence Rule.
The trial court was led into prejudicial error of
making in effect a contract between plaintiff and Otto
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Buehner & Company to which plaintiff never assented,
and to which plaintiff refused to assent because it imposed on plaintiff an obligation contrary to law to
allow its competitor to take plaintiff's aggregate not
only below plaintiff's quoted prices, but at defendants'
dictated prices below plaintiff's costs to plaintiff's damage and detriment and for the unjust enrichment of
plaintiff. The trial court by implication allowed Otto
Buehner & Company to have aggregate at defendants'
dictated price of $20.50 per ton, not only for the church
office building job, but for other jobs not even referred
to in Exhibit 19-P.
The respondents who were the beneficiaries of such
illegal price-fixing and unfair trade practices now have
the audacity to ask this Honorable Court to affirm
such judgment in disregard of the plain interdiction of
the statutes, and in disregard of the constitutional
rights of plaintiff.
The unconscionable attitude of defendants was
manifested when Otto Buehner & Company in December 1969 refused to talk to plaintiff's officers, but told
them to get in touch with Brimhall, apparently knowing he was leaving town. Then when no purchase order
was issued to plaintiff and in February 1970 when
plaintiff's officer asked the Buehner office manager
when plaintiff was going to be paid for its aggregate
taken by the Buehner company, plaintiff received the
curt reply, "You are not going to be paid." Otto Buehner & Company wrote Exhibit 19-P so that all money
would be paid solely to Brifhall. Brimhall collected all
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the money in his own name until June 29, 1970. None
of defendants' arguments can erase their unconscionable
misconduct.
IV.
T H E U N I T E D STATES D I S T R I C T COURT
H A S NO J U D I C I A L P O W E R TO O V E R R U L E
T H E D E C I S I O N S O F T H E S U P R E M E COURT
O F U T A H , N O R TO I S S U E SOME I N T E R PRETATION OF A U T A H STATUTE BINDI N G T H I S COURT.
On pages 25 to 28 of their brief, respondents cite
and quote from a memorandum decision on the liability
phase of a case in the United States District Court. No
judgment has been entered. There has merely been a
determination of liability under Federal statutes affecting interstate commerce. It is immaterial whether the
Utah statutes are inapplicable in a Federal court case
involving price-fixing and monopoly or other unfair
practices in interstate commerce. The case before this
Court involves State statutes and intrastate commerce.
With all due respect to the United States District
Court ,it has no power to overrule the decisions of the
Supreme Court of Utah relating to State statutes, nor
to issue any interpretation of a Utah statute which
would be binding on this Court.
Respondents apparently confused the trial court
in arguments which impugned directly or indirectly the
constitutionality of the Unfair Practices Act and the
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Utah statute against price-fixing combinations in restraint of trade. However, it appears that whatever
claims respondents made in the lower court, they have
abandoned such argument and are not now challenging
the constitutionality of either set of statutes. Consequently, there is no need to defend the constitutionality
of either statute. Respondents are saying that those
statutes are not applicable in this case and misstate the
facts in an argument designed to make those statutes
inapplicable. Respondents are indeed desperate for
argument when they have to look for some memorandum in a Federal case in which there is no judgment
entered, in an attempt to tell this Court that it ought
to follow the decision of the lower Federal court.

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully submits that respondents
have not met any issue squarely, but have misstated the
evidence and omitted reference to all of respondents'
as well as Brimhall's admissions, and that plaintiffappellant should have the relief as requested in the
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant.
Respectfully submitted,
P A U L E. R E I M A N N
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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